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SYMPOSIUM ON CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN SHIELDS
HUMAN SHIELDS, SOVEREIGN POWER, AND THE EVISCERATION OF THE CIVILIAN
Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini*
Human shields were prominent in the 2016 military campaign seeking to recapture Mosul from the hands of
ISIS militants. On October 24, 2016, Pope Francis expressed his concern over the use of over two hundred boys
and men as human shields in the Iraqi city.1 In an election rally the following day, Donald Trump decried the
enemy’s use of “human shields all over the place,”2 while the New York Times reported that the Islamic State
is driving hundreds of civilians into Mosul, using them as human shields. A few days later, the United Nations
disseminated a press release, warning that ISIS militants are using “tens of thousands” as human shields, thus
casting massive numbers of Iraqi civilians as weapons of war.3
Surely thousands of Iraqi civilians did not volunteer to become shields, and, most likely, the vast majority of
them were not coerced into becoming involuntary shields. Their proximity to the fray in Mosul,4 a city that had
become a conﬂict zone, was enough to brand them as weapons and to categorize them as human shields, thereby
stripping them of some of the protections international humanitarian law (IHL) bestows on civilians.5
International law allows military forces to strike targets protected by human shields and even to kill these shields,
provided the attack takes place in accordance with the principles of proportionality and military necessity.6 The
human shield is a civilian whose status as a civilian is assumed only to be disavowed.
This paradoxical dual nature of the human shield informs the 2015 U.S. Department of Defense Law of War
Manual, which explains that
in some cases, a party to a conﬂict may attempt to use the presence or movement of the civilian population
or individual civilians in order to shield military objectives from seizure or attack. When enemy persons
engage in such behavior, commanders should continue to seek to discriminate in conducting attacks and to
take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to the civilian population and civilian objects. However,
* Neve Gordon is a professor of politics at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel and a Leverhulme visiting professor at SOAS, University of London,
UK. He would like to acknowledge the support of the American Council of Learned Societies. Nicola Perugini is a lecturer at the Department of Politics and
International Relations at the University of Edinburgh.
1 Pope Francis distressed at use of boys as human shields in Mosul, Iraq, ROME REP. (Oct. 24, 2016).
2 Tim Hains, Trump: Now We’re Bogged Down In Mosul Because Obama Gave Away The Element Of Surprise, REALCLEARPOLITICS (Oct. 24,
2016).
3 U.N.: ISIS using “tens of thousands” as human shields in Mosul, CBSNEWS (Oct. 28, 2016, 6:18 AM).
4 Matthew W. Ezzo & Amos N. Guiora, A Critical Decision Point on the Battleﬁeld – Friend, Foe or Innocent Bystander, in SECURITY: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY NORMATIVE APPROACH (Cecilia M. Bailliet ed., 2009).
5 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts art. 51(7),
June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
6 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2004).
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the ability to discriminate and to reduce the risk of harm to the civilian population likely will be diminished
by such enemy conduct.7
Human shielding, in other words, increases the scope of legitimate “collateral damage” (i.e., killing of civilians),
and, as the debates about the Manual indicate (here,8 here,9 and here10), produces a legal grey zone.
The phrase human shield is not merely descriptive. Rather, the term operates as a “perlocutionary speech act.”
Philosopher of language John Austin explained that these kind of speech acts “produce certain consequential
effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it
may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them.”11 As a perlocutionary speech act, the
term “human shields” bestowed a legal deﬁnition upon thousands of Iraqi civilians–before the assault on
Mosul even began—that preemptively relaxed the conditions under which Iraqi forces and their allies could deploy
violence. Consequently, the phrase itself actively participated in structuring acts of war. This is why Judith Butler
argues that such framing should not be understood as the neutral description or a belated neutral arbiter of a
conﬂict that has already taken place.12 Precisely because international law treats human shields differently from
civilians, relaxing, as it were, the deployment of violence, the very uttering of the phrase human shields by the
United Nations and other prominent international political actors served to legitimate in advance repertoires
of violence that militaries could use when ﬁghting in Mosul.
Mosul is not unique. Numerous state and nonstate actors have been warning the world that the use of human
shields is on the rise in different theatres of violence. Media reports from Syria, where ISIS ﬁghters ﬂed Manbij in
convoys apparently using human shields,13 to Iraq, where government forces had halted the “Fallujah advance
amid fears for 50,000 human shields,” have criticized the use of civilians as weapons in war.14 These incessant
invocations, we maintain, are part of an ongoing process that has the potential to eviscerate IHL’s category of
civilian. The civilian, in other words, is deﬂated and transformed into a legal ﬁgure that can be more readily killed
without it being a crime.
The prominence of this legal ﬁgure is relatively new. In October 2015, a LexisNexis search of English-speaking
media outlets detected 314 articles referring to human shields; by October 2016, the number of articles using the
phrase reached 2675 (an increase of 850%). But even more remarkable is the fact that in the articles covering the
June 2014 ISIS onslaught on Mosul there was not a single mention of human shielding. Thousands of Iraqi troops
were stationed inside the city in an effort to defend it from an ISIS attack. Neither the United Nations nor any
other actor cast the civilians among whom the Iraqi army was stationed as shields. So what is the difference
between Mosul 2014 and Mosul 2016? And why have human shields suddenly become so prominent within a
variety of battlespaces across the globe? Looking back at the ﬁrst historical debates surrounding the use of
human shields sheds important light on the way this legal ﬁgure is currently being deployed and its ambivalent
function in contemporary wars.
7 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL (2015).
8 Adil Ahmad Haque, The Defense Department’s Indefensible Position on Killing Human Shields, JUSTSECURITY (June 22, 2015, 2:11 PM).
9 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.,Human Shields and the DoDLaw ofWarManual: Can’tWe Improve the Debate?, JUSTSECURITY (June 25, 2015, 9:43 AM).
10 Neve Gordon & Nicola Perugini, Human Shields: The Weapon of the Strong, JUSTSECURITY (Oct. 22, 2015, 9:30 AM).
11 JOHN LANGSHAW AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 101 (2d ed. 1975).
12 Judith Butler, Human Shields, 3 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 2, 5 (2015).
13 Jamie McIntyre, U.S. held ﬁre as ISIS ﬁghters ﬂed Syrian city using human shields, WASH. EXAMMER (Aug. 16, 2016, 2:54 PM).
14 Martin Smith, Iraqi forces halt Fallujah advance amid fears for 50,000 human shields, UPI (June 3, 2016, 10:23 AM).
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Human Shields and Sovereignty
While it is likely that the practice of human shielding has a long history, the legal debate surrounding the use of
human shields acquired an international dimension after the 1870–71 Franco-German War. Following numerous
sabotage attacks carried out by Francs-tireurs against trains controlled by the Germans, the German Civil Governor
of Rheims published the following order in 1870:
[T]he trains shall be accompanied by well-known and respected [French] persons inhabiting the towns or
other localities in the neighborhood of the lines. These persons shall be placed upon the engine, so that it
may be understood that in every accident caused by the hostility of the inhabitants, their compatriots will be
the ﬁrst to suffer. The competent civil and military authorities together with the railway companies and the
etappen commandants will organize a service of hostages to accompany the trains.15
Dedicating a section on such incidents in his book on international law, the renowned German jurist Lassa
Oppenheim explained that
when unknown people frequently wrecked the trains transporting troops, the Germans seized prominent
enemy citizens and put them on the engines of trains to prevent the latter from being wrecked, a means
which always proved effective and soon put a stop to further train-wrecking. The same practice was
resorted to, although for a short time only, by Lord Roberts in 1900 during the South African War.16
At around the same time, prominent French jurists such as Antoine Pillet and Henry Bonﬁls and the English
lawyer William Hall argued that human shielding undermined the principle of noncombatant immunity and con-
stituted a violation of military virtue.17 Speaking about the German deployment of human shields in Dijon, Gray,
and Vesoul, Pillet writes:
On [these] occasions the notables of the occupied towns were forced to get on military trains in order to
protect [German] soldiers from being shot by francs-tireurs… . [This] constitutes one of the most evident
violations generated by recent practices of war… . This practice reminds us of those rioters who place in
the ﬁrst lines women and children, hoping that military troops will not shoot toward them. The ﬁght might
take place among soldiers and there is no military virtue in using non-combatants as shields against the
military operations of the enemy… . Non-combatant immunity is against this kind of practice.18
By contrast, Oppenheim, followed by the British jurist James Spaight, defended the legitimacy of using human
shields in instances when the forces attacking the train were not part of an ofﬁcial military and therefore not ﬁght-
ing at the behest of a sovereign power.19 The fact that the Frenchmilitants were irregulars—militants whose ﬁght-
ing is not recognized as carried out on behalf of an acknowledged sovereign entity—justiﬁed, in their opinion, the
use of human shields as a reprisal technique by the occupying forces.
While the recent military campaign in Mosul is clearly different from the Franco-German War, the statist
conception of international law espoused by Oppenheim and Spaight underscores that the intervention of irreg-
ulars—today’s insurgents, guerillas, or terrorists, but also at times protestors or rioters—is still decisive when
15 Cited in WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (1890).
16 LASSA FRANCIS LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 272 (1912).
17 ANTOINE PILLET, LES LOIS ACTUELLES DE LA GUERRE (1901) (translation ours); Henry BONFILS, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC (DROIT DES GENS) (1898). HALL, supra note 15.
18 PILLET, supra note 17, at 213.
19 OPPENHEIM, supra note 16; JAMES MOLONY SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND (1911).
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interpreting themeaning of violence. It helps us understand why Iraqi civilians inMosul were not framed as shields
in 2014, but were depicted as shields in 2016, and why civilians living near Israel’s command base at the center of
Tel-Aviv are not considered to be human shields when Hamas launches its rockets at the city, while Palestinian
civilians are portrayed as shields when Israel ﬁres missiles into Gaza.20 If in the 19th century the intervention of
irregulars legitimized the use of human shields by the military operating at the behest of a sovereign state, currently
the proximity of civilians to irregulars transforms the former to human shields. Despite the gradual reconﬁgura-
tion of what was “previously a purely statist European international law,”21 the specter of the statist approach
continues to inform prevalent interpretations of international law.
The Various forms of Human Shielding
Legal experts generally refer to three types of human shields: voluntary, involuntary and proximate. Given Banu
Bargu’s nuanced deﬁnition of voluntary human shields in this symposium, here we just note that the term refers to
a civilian who willingly decides to protect a military target using his or her body to achieve deterrence by invoking a
certain moral sensibility among attackers and spectators.22 Voluntary human shields are often activists who travel
to conﬂict zones in order to politically intervene against organized violence by situating themselves in high-value
target areas while risking their lives in an effort to deter attacks.23 An involuntary shield is a civilian who is forced by
soldiers or militants to serve as a buffer between them and their enemies. Placing well-known French notables on
the engines of trains during the Franco-GermanWar was a case of involuntary shielding. Finally, proximate shields
refer to civilians situated in the midst of a conﬂict zone and whose mere presence can serve to transform them into
shields for one of the ﬁghting parties. The vast majority of human shields in Sri Lanka’s civil war, the case study
discussed in Beth Van Schaack’s essay, seem to have been proximate shields.24 Indeed, the dramatic increase in
urban warfare, which the International Committee of the Red Cross has characterized as the “civilianization of
armed conﬂict,”25 entails that civilians inevitably occupy the front lines of the ﬁghting and can thus be more easily
categorized as proximate shields.
The United Nations categorization of “tens of thousands” of Iraqi civilians inMosul as human shields is not the
only instance where civilians in conﬂict zones were framed as proximate shields. A LexisNexis search in “major
publications” for the phrase “human shields” over the one-year period between November 1 2015 and October
31, 2016 found 1,221 articles.26 Of these articles, sixty-ﬁve describe voluntary shields, 272 depict involuntary
shields, 731 portray civilians who have become shields because they live in the midst of the ﬁghting, and 153
use the phrase as a metaphor. When examining the actual number of people who are described as human shields
in these articles, one ﬁnds reference to seven voluntary shields, 9,456 involuntary shields and 3,354,800 proximate
shields. The number of voluntary human shields is negligible despite being discussed in 5 percent of the articles,
while involuntary shields account for 0.2 percent of the people who are described as shields and 22 percent of the
articles. The fact that almost 75 percent of the articles describe proximate shields and that over 99 percent of the
20 NEVE GORDON & NICOLA PERUGINI, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DOMINATE 84–100 (2016).
21 CARL SCHMITT, THEORY OF THE PARTISAN: INTERMEDIATE COMMENTARY ON THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 15 (G.L. Ulmen transl.
2007).
22 Banu Bargu, Bodies against War: Voluntary Human Shielding as a Practice of Resistance, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 299 (2016).
23 Banu Bargu, Human Shields, 12 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 277 (2013).
24 Beth Van Schaack, Human Shields: Complementary Duties under IHL, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 317 (2016).
25 Andreas Wenger & Simon JA Mason, The Civilianization of Armed Conﬂict: Trends and Implications, 90 ICRC REV. 835 (2008).
26 The search identiﬁed 1,903 articles that used the phrase human shields, but 682 of these were duplicates. When counting the number
of people used as shields, we counted each incident only once but used the largest ﬁgure provided in the articles describing the incident.
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civilians who are characterized as shields belong to the proximate category is an extremely important ﬁnding, not
only because it suggests that legal scholars should not limit their analysis to voluntary and involuntary shields, but
also because the framing of so many civilians as proximate shields reveals something noteworthy about the use of
IHL in contemporary wars.
The Colonial Imprint of Human Shielding
Decolonization, as Vasuki Nesiah argues, is a crucial setting for understanding both the current political sig-
niﬁcance of the human shield clause and the way it helps undo the civilian/combatant distinction in contemporary
wars.27 We maintain that the ﬁgure of the human shield has, in many ways, come to replace the colonial subject of
old. During colonialism, when colonial states killed the colonized, they did so without violating international law
because, inter alia, the distinction between a civilian and combatant did not apply to the indigenous populations. In
other words, colonial subjects—the uncivilized nonsovereign—were considered outside IHL’s sphere of protec-
tion.28 Following decolonization, the category of civilian and the distinction between civilians and combatants
were extended to include the ex-colonized, who were then guaranteed protection under international law.
It is precisely within this context that we read the postcolonial articulation of Article 51(7) of the 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the Convention, which prohibits the use of human shields while reiterating the legitimacy of military
targeting of areas protected by human shields.29 This Protocol, it is crucial to emphasize, coalesced in the wake of
decolonization, when former nonwhite subjects ﬁrst acquired self-determination and sovereignty through the
establishment of independent states. For the ﬁrst time, killing civilians in Africa and in other previously colonized
regions was considered a crime according to IHL, since the residents in these decolonized countries became cit-
izens of an autonomous sovereign entity.
Within this postcolonial context, whereby IHL applies to all civilians, and in an era where most ﬁghting tran-
spires in civilian spaces often situated in ex-colonies, the legal phrase human shields helps to transform civilians
into legitimate targets of lethal violence while justifying their wide-scale killing, often along racial lines. Beyond the
prominence of proximate human shielding, the LexisNexis search also exposed that the phrase human shield has
been mobilized almost exclusively in conﬂict zones that have been taking place in decolonized areas of the globe.
Indeed, practically all references to human shielding in the one-year period we examined are from Yemen, Iraq,
and Syria. A search that includes the past ﬁve years reveals that human shields are mentioned in Ukraine but that
human shielding is primarily used in reference to Gaza, Nigeria, and other ex-colonized spaces. In the case of
Israel’s recent wars in Gaza—in which the human shield argument has been mobilized against the entire popu-
lation—the ﬁgures of the nonsovereign-colonized-subject and the civilian-transformed-into-a-human-shield
completely coincide.30 The Gaza war also illuminates the colonial imprint on our present moment.
Human Shielding as State Lawfare
The predominance of the statist approach to human shielding, the perlocutionary mobilization of the phrase
human shield, and the framing of so many nonwhite civilians as killable proximate shields highlight something
crucial about the increasing use of IHL’s shielding clause by sovereign states in contemporary wars. What
27 Vasuki Nesiah, Human Shields/Human Crosshairs: Colonial Legacies and Contemporary Wars, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 323 (2016).
28 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
29 Protocol I, supra note 5.
30 Neve Gordon & Nicola Perugini, The Politics of Human Shielding: On the Resigniﬁcation of Space and the Constitution of Civilians as Shields in
Liberal Wars, 34 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 34 168, 183 (2016).
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seems clear is that the phrase human shield is not only descriptive, but is also being adopted pervasively, preemp-
tively, and strategically as a constitutive part of warfare. Indeed, the human shielding clause forcibly demonstrates
how IHL can be a tool that enables sovereign violence against civilians, rather than one that restrains it. The legal
ﬁgure of the human shield is a war-making and war-enabling tool: a form of lawfare that is quickly eviscerating the
notion of the civilian or any universalist pretensions of the notion of the civilian.
Legal experts often deﬁne our era as one dominated by lawfare, whereby international law is used as technique of
warfare by nonstate actors against sovereign states. According to Charles Dunlap, certain actors provoke the use of
violence against civilians by deploying human shields, and when civilians end up dying during the fray these same
actors accuse liberal militaries of war crimes.31 The processes we analyzed in this essay point to a different and
more complex reality. First, state actors are equally involved in wars taking place in civilian areas—producing sit-
uations of civilian involvement in hostilities and human shielding. Indeed, human shielding is produced through
the interaction of different actors within battlespaces and is not the prerogative of nonstate-actors. Second, it is
precisely state actors and organizations operating at their behest that have been more frequently invoking human
shielding clauses as lawfare against nonstate actors in order to protect themselves from any form of legal account-
ability for the killing of civilians in contemporary wars.
We therefore agree that lawfare has become pervasive, but in contrast to Dunlap, we maintain that the legal
phrase human shields is frequently deployed by sovereign states as a form of lawfare. IHL human shielding clauses,
in their current conﬁguration, function as a lawfare tool for preemptively legitimizing state violence against vast
groups of civilians living in areas controlled by nonstate actors. Indeed, human shielding is being translated into
state lawfare: the use of international law to justify sovereign violence against civilians.
31 Charles J. Dunlap. Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 146 (2008).
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